Idle at times, preoccupied with a wide range of concerns at others, the officers confined to the prison camps were soon led to take a close interest in the situation in France, which was being crushed by Germany. As a result, the duty of reserve imposed on the military before the defeat, to avoid political confrontation within their ranks, was soon broken. It is true that the prisoners could only with great difficulty carry out any significant practical activity in this field; but they were able to form their own opinions on the measures taken or to be taken by the authorities in France, to express and possibly discuss these opinions among themselves and display attitudes or reactions corresponding to these opinions.
Some testimonies could be given, after the return of the prisoners, on certain aspects of political life in Gross-Born Oflag IID and Arnswalde Oflag IIB, but no overall study, no poll, no survey, unless I am mistaken, was carried out during the captivity itself. Moreover, the achievements that can be mentioned in this field are often difficult to interpret, because a person who had a certain outward attitude, a certain discourse could, in fact, have intentions that were in contradiction with his actions or statements. Nevertheless, general tendencies can, with the benefit of an inventory, be identified in the political life of the two Pomeranian Oflags, by distinguishing two main periods of roughly equal length: the first 30 months of captivity were mainly focused on the problems of the moment, while the last 30 months were focused on the future. And first of all, it is worth noting something obvious that should not be forgotten: all the prisoners arrived behind the barbed wire with opinions, a personal political culture, generally unexpressed under arms, corresponding to the range of parties existing in France before 1940. And these opinions necessarily influenced the answers that each of them gave
to a concern that arose very quickly after the capture:
Why did the French armies suffer such a rout?
In other words, who was responsible for the disaster? The first reaction was often to accuse the military commanders of having pursued a suicidal strategy between 1919 and 1939. But immediately afterwards, another question emerged: why did these men, chosen by the civilian power, come to this?
And it is the entire political, diplomatic, social, trade union, financial, industrial, educational and even religious life of the interwar period that was examined critically. In particular, it was within this framework that the reasons why the fortifications of the "Maginot Line" were stopped in the east of Sedan were examined. And the 'whys' were added to the 'whys', with the answers depending directly on the opinion that some and others already had about the fortunes of the Third Republic. And one can legitimately think that, in their majority, the prisoners were not kind to many of the civil and military leaders of the 1920s and 1930s. Scapegoats were found by everyone according to their past convictions. In the end, it was on this ground that political opinions in the camps developed.
At the same time as this flashback, a first cleavage appeared to everyone: the signing of the armistice, which came into force on 25 June 1940. The prisoner officers, like their subordinates, had experienced the extent of the defeat intensely. They could see the dramatic situation in invaded France. The temptation to find relief from their despondency was great. And at the beginning of their captivity, few of them had heard the call to resistance launched on 18 June, from London, by General de Gaulle. In this context, each of them had to make a quick personal choice between approving the decision taken by Marshal Pétain to stop the sporadic fighting that was still going on desperately around 15 June 1940 and adhering to General de Gaulle's clear-cut position.
In other words, was it necessary to agree, partly out of a disciplinary reflex, with the authorities acting in France or to declare oneself in solidarity with a general officer opposing, from abroad, the position taken by these same authorities? One can think that quite a few of them, having recently been taken prisoner, preferred to see the German advance contained to the north of a demarcation line, which would have avoided the occupation of about half of the national territory, despite the very severe conditions imposed by the victor. Still discussing these divergent opinions, the prisoners in the Oflags soon had a variety of concerns.
In Gross-Born, as elsewhere, they were subjected, as we know, to very difficult living conditions. They could only hope for a rapid liberation, hoping that by its resigned attitude towards the Germans, to say the least, the government set up in Vichy would be able to obtain their return to France as soon as possible. But in the same period, they learned that Hitler had given up invading England, that he had lost the air battle of September 1940, that in July, the British had disarmed the French fleet in Alexandria and attacked that of Mers el Kebir, and that finally, in August, General de Gaulle, with a British squadron, had tried to land at Dakar. These naval actions could, it is true, be explained by the needs of London's strategy. But they could also raise doubts about Franco-British friendship.
Above all, added to the events that had taken place over the Channel in September, they proved the determination of the British, and therefore announced the continuation of the war beyond a foreseeable horizon. This situation led the prisoners of Gross-Born, like those of the other Oflags, to take a particular interest in what was happening in France, in two respects: the National Revolution and the collaboration. Having measured the extent of the disaster of May and June 1940 and having sought to identify the reasons that could explain it, the officers of Oflag IID began to ask themselves a central question: how to get France to recover from the catastrophe it had suffered so quickly? What concrete measures should be taken at national level to ensure that past shortcomings were not repeated?
In order to carry out this research, they had at their disposal multiple sources of information but of very unequal value. Family letters received in limited numbers and subject to German censorship gave them some echoes of the atmosphere in occupied and non-occupied France. The French national press, particularly oriented, provided them with information in the form of propaganda. The German press provided some supplements, which were especially questionable. On the other hand, the "Journal Parlé", written by some officers in the camp, played an important role in the dissemination of the news expected by all. In addition to all these sources that could inform Gross-Born's officers, many documents arrived at the camp, often as propaganda, presenting the various aspects of the National Revolution launched by the Vichy government and concerning the new constitutional, administrative, judicial, financial, economic, social, educational and teaching organisations. These documents made it possible, in a word, to learn about the policy conducted in France, in its principles if not in all its achievements. In addition, it should be pointed out that the newspaper "Ecrit sur le Sable", created in the camp at the beginning of 1941, in a short paragraph of its first issue, expressed the opinion that there was reason to side with Marshal Pétain. And at the end of that year, the "Cercle Pétain" was launched, whose activities were to include, in particular, conferences designed to spread Vichy ideas, even though this centre was supposed to deal with social and folkloric issues. It was on this basis that the Gross-Born officers were able to form their opinions on Vichy domestic policy. A significant proportion of them were upset by a climate of revenge which led this policy to discriminatory measures of which they disapproved. But it seems that, throughout the first two years of captivity, a significant number of the prisoners in 0flags IID found interesting at least some of the orientations taken by Marshal Pétain's government to reorganise the life of the nation. And, as a result, they placed real trust in the victor of Verdun. This is suggested by a number of facts which, without being totally decisive, could not have occurred without a certain sufficiently favourable atmosphere.
Thus, on 1 May 1941, the new bank holidays and the Marshal's day were celebrated in the camp at the same time. On this occasion, greetings were sent to the Marshal. On 30 April, a lecture given by the rector of the camp university on the personality of the Marshal was well attended. On 15 August, the French colonel, the camp's dean, again sent greetings to Marshal Pétain in the name of the 3,000 officers of the Gross-Born camp and these greetings were published in the newspaper "Ecrit sur le Sable". The latter, moreover, issue after issue, maintained the line of conduct announced from its launch. In January 1942, the officers of Oflag IID were invited to sign a guest book which transmitted the camp's wishes to the head of state. It is true that some of them voluntarily signed this document, despite their disagreement, in order not to draw attention to their personal projects.
In addition, initiatives were taken in September 1942, aimed at young officers, with an educational and therefore not necessarily political purpose: creation of a "Chantiers de Jeunesse" centre, transposing to the camp the aims and activities of the youth work camps existing in France; then replacement of this centre (after the occupation of the free zone by the Germans and the sending of young people from the work camps to Germany as workers) by a general training centre in the spirit of the Uriage executive school; creation of a group of "Compagnons de France" centred on the idea of trades, following the example of the youth movement created in the free zone.
Certainly, one can think that the propaganda made, directly or indirectly, for the National Revolution was far from convincing all those who listened to it or read it. And there was certainly a good contingent of opponents of Vichy's domestic policy in the camp during 1941 and 1942. But in the end, it can be admitted that some of the measures taken in France, over a period of about 24 months, appeared to a number of officers impossible to evaluate but far from negligible, to be of a nature to replace some of the errors which had preceded the misfortunes of 1940. Quite different was the reception given to the policy of collaboration. It is obvious that a prisoner cannot willingly endure the ordeal of internment, especially if it is prolonged and brutally imposed.
Although the Germans more or less respected some of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions established by the Red Cross for officers, they imposed harsh living conditions in Gross-Born, as elsewhere, which could not help but offend the prisoners of war. And the POWs could not forget the deep vexation of the defeat, nor the barbaric acts perpetrated by the Wehrmacht, such as the execution of Senegalese prisoners and their cadres south of Amiens, nor the bad faith of those who captured combatants after the Armistice. No doubt some could admire the organisation, discipline and combat efficiency of the German troops; but the deep patriotism of the captured officers had been too wounded for them to consider their guards as partners.
In fact, the internees in Gross-Born could do little to resist their jailers: certain individual and sometimes collective attitudes, during roll calls for example, to show their pride in their misfortune; irony; some slight provocation. The effective barbed wire networks and the armed sentries who watched over them from their watchtowers dissuaded them from undertaking large-scale actions that could have led to massacres. And sometimes it was in the interest of the camp to show some goodwill, using trickery and bribery, to obtain limited but valuable services, such as means of escape or cultural activities in the camp. In any case, no one would have wanted to be dragged into an adventure like "Bridge on the River Kwai", shown in the cinema after the war, without any real historical basis.
This virtually unanimous position was reinforced when the prisoners of Gross-Born learned that the word collaboration had been uttered during the meeting between Pétain and Hitler in Montoire on 24 October 1940. Certainly, this policy of Franco-German collaboration could give rise to hopes of an imminent liberation. And some officers could rejoice in it. And it is true that, in addition to the prisoners released because they belonged to certain easily understandable categories, veterans of the First World War, sick members of the Health Service, fathers of large families, a little more than a hundred (approximately) were sent back to France on the intervention of the Vichy services.
But for the vast majority of prisoners, collaboration was seen from the outset as an unacceptable fool's bargain that allowed Germany to exploit France even more, without any quid pro quo for the latter. It could not therefore be approved, although no one could really say how the pressure of the victor could be lessened, given the power and determination of the latter.
However, in the camp, there were some means to fight against the oppression of the guards which were not neglected. The first was the obstinacy of those who tried to escape. In Gross-Born, this was a difficult but possible undertaking, particularly because of the sandy nature of the area, which made it suitable for tunneling. But the results were rather disappointing, for despite the ingenuity and courage of the would-be escapees, many failed in their endeavour.
In any case, the crime committed by a German officer, who mortally wounded Lieutenant Rabin on 8 March 1942 as he was coming out of a tunnel, had an immediate effect: a scandalized reprobation of the prisoners of Gross-Born and thus the reinforcement of their rejection of any collaboration. This rejection was further fuelled by certain shows, by the "Ballon Captif", a one-page newspaper written in a humorous and satirical style. And it was felt, more or less clearly, at least in an allusive way, in the letters sent to France and therefore read by the German censors. Finally, this same feeling was expressed during a few collective demonstrations, admittedly few in number, during which the memory of past glories and the dead of the battles of 1914-1918 and 1939-1940 were evoked.
All this constituted only a very weak resistance. And it must even be said that the spirit that animated it was not shared to the end by all of Gross-Born's officers. In fact, in 1942, about 150 of them, for personal reasons that are difficult to know, agreed to leave the camp to go and work in German organisations or companies. Did they take this decision to collaborate with the victors or for other reasons? Almost disapproved of by the majority of their comrades, they generally refrained from answering these questions.
Thus, when the officers of Oflag IID were transferred from the Gross-Born camp to the Arnswalde barracks, the location of Oflag IIB, in May 1942, propaganda for the 'National Revolution' was developing with limited success and opposition to the policy of collaboration was in the minds of the people, but little in action. And the essential questions were then the following: What are the British and Russians doing? When will the Americans intervene? When will the prisoners be released?
The answers came in the form of three events that occurred in quick succession: on 8 November 1942, the Americans landed in North Africa; on 11 November, the Germans occupied the free zone; on 31 January 1943, Marshal Paulus capitulated at Stalingrad.
At the same time, at the end of 1942, a novelty emerged in Arnswalde: the operation of a radio receiver, admittedly very rudimentary, but capable of picking up broadcasts from London. The war thus took a decisive turn and the prisoners of 0flag IIB could find a new lease of life.
At the end of 1942, the use of the first radio set allowed the creation of a new clandestine information bulletin, which took the name of "ISF" (they are screwed). Then, soon, 2, 3 and then 4 efficient receivers appeared. These sources of information became both complementary and competing. And this had an influence on the evolution of political life in Oflag IIB.
First of all, there was almost unanimity on one point, collaboration, because if it could have been admitted, eventually, by some, it became clearly indefensible. But at the same time, the camp officers became more aware of the activities of the various resistance movements in France which were trying to fight the German occupation forces by all means, including intelligence, sabotage, and individual or collective actions. They were increasingly reinforced in their anti-German feelings. And the representatives of the Scapini mission who came to Arnswalde to try to convince them of the validity of the Vichy policy only succeeded in exasperating them to the highest degree. Gradually, the newspaper 'Ecrit sur le Sable' changed its discourse and eventually disappeared. The Pétain circle followed its example.
On the other hand, paradoxically, despite this new situation, the preferred act of resistance, i.e. the escape attempt, became almost impossible in Arnswalde. It was practically unthinkable to dig up the ground and the guard system was especially effective.
What remained was to intensify and amplify the individual and collective demonstrations. Acts of arrogance towards the guards became more and more numerous. In 1944, on 6 June for the Normandy landings, on 15 August for the Provence landings and on 25 August for the liberation of Paris, the officers of 0flag IIB, contrary to their custom, presented themselves at the daily roll call in the most impeccable uniforms possible and in perfect order. This was a special way of taunting their guards on the occasion of the bitter defeats suffered by the German armies on these dates. Moreover, on 14 July 1944, on the occasion of a retrospective review of French song, despite the censorship bans, a particularly vigorous Marseillaise rang out, in the presence of German officers furious at this unexpected provocation.
In parallel with these reactions, which remained limited because of the means of retaliation that could be used by the Germans, a nagging question remained: when could the return to France take place? Forecasts made, in particular, on the basis of the obituaries of local newspapers reporting on soldiers killed in combat, did not envisage this return before the end of 1944 or even before the spring of 1945. This means that a major concern was to follow, as accurately as possible, the evolution of the situation on the Italian, Russian and then French and Belgian fronts.
But it also means that, because of this evolution, attachment to Marshal Pétain, insofar as it existed, could no longer be appropriate and that, on the contrary, approval of General de Gaulle's action in Algiers became practically unavoidable. The opposition between him and General Giraud was no doubt known. The former had a military view and a preoccupation with internal politics, according to the situation of France as a whole, whereas the latter aimed, as he said, at "one single goal, victory" and gave priority to the fighting and therefore to the means necessary to carry it out. This opposition fuelled conversations but General de Gaulle's position, in its entirety, prevailed in people's minds.
It must be stressed that this position gave rise to criticism on one point or another. Indeed, the diversity of information coming from the teams operating the radio sets available in the camp gave rise to a kind of mimicry by which the sometimes opposing tendencies of the different resistance movements in France influenced the world of the officers of Oflag IIB. Thus, for example, some of the latter began to think, according to their former political family, about the measures to be taken after the liberation of the national territory. And some of them thought that General de Gaulle's intention to dismantle Germany after the Allied victory was not a good one. They considered it better to sanction the Reich only in a limited way in order to avoid the return of the Germanic policy of the 1930s.
In order to confirm the spirit of resistance and to foresee the future, a clandestine organisation was then created under the name of "Groupement Liberté" which had a newspaper with the title "Ciment". Another organisation was created later, called "Comité Gaulliste Républicain", which aimed at a wider recruitment but which remained less important. Various witnesses have assured us that several hundred officers who wished to show, in their own way, their resistance to the German yoke were affected in this way without any possibility of verification.
And it should be remembered that several of them were sent to the Lübeck camp, which was intended, from the beginning of the captivity, to group together the prisoner officers whose attitude the Germans wanted to sanction. As for the real action of the groups in question, it was, according to some of their members, more in the minds of the people than in concrete reality.
This rather subterranean turmoil lasted until 29 January 1945, without undermining the friendship and solidarity born of the hardships endured for over four and a half years. On that date, the officers of Oflag IIB left Arnswalde, on foot, in the snow, in columns flanked by their armed guards, to head west. The Russians were advancing towards the Oder. On the road, each one worked, practically only, to overcome the difficulties, the physical and moral sufferings of the end of the captivity. Arriving in France in the spring of '45 or, for some, in the summer, the former Gross-Born and Arnswalde soldiers could then, if they so wished, find their pre-1939 political family in France, which was being rebuilt.